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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 767 (1992), which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 27 July 1992.
2. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the concerned Somali factions and movements. I also transmitted copies to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, and to the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), OAU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
3. A technical team was established under the leadership of Mr. Peter Hansen, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, and visited Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, having assembled in Nairobi on 4 August. During its stay in Somalia, it travelled to Bardera, Baidoa, Belet Wien, Kismayu, Galkaio, Garowe, Bossasso, Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. At all these places, it met with the leaders and representatives of various Somali factions and movements, as well as with elders. (See the annex to the present report for the team's itinerary and programme of meetings.)
4. Members of the team also visited Haddour and Dushareb, as well as Mandera, Bulacao, Liboi, and Diboi, on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border. An aerial survey of the border was also undertaken.
5. On 17 August, the team leader held consultations with the Kenyan authorities on issues of particular concern to them.
6. On his return to New York on 21 August 1992, the team leader delivered his report to me. The present report describes the action currently being taken by the United Nations in response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and contains my recommendations for other action which needs to be taken

immediately. Further reports will in due course be presented on action to be taken in the medium and longer term.

I. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

7. My previous reports to the Security Council have described in detail the humanitarian needs of the affected populations in Somalia and the urgency of establishing appropriate arrangements for the delivery and distribution of relief supplies throughout the country. The Council will, in particular, recall the consolidated inter-agency 90-day plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance to Somalia which was annexed to my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829/Add.1).

8. United Nations agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have continued throughout this period to implement the 90-day plan and to intensify and extend their humanitarian activities in Somalia. So far this year, the World Food Programme (WFP) has delivered 36,500 metric tons of food to Somalia, mainly to Mogadishu. WFP is ready to deliver another 30,000 metric tons immediately and plans to deliver the additional 85,000 metric tons called for in the latest of the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA) appeal, as soon as the necessary conditions can be created and donor support is available. Since the beginning of 1992, ICRC has delivered 83,000 metric tons of food to various parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu. It plans to deliver another 70,000 metric tons during the next five months. Bilateral donors such as Saudi Arabia and France have also shipped food and other assistance.

9. Since March, a joint WFP/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) airlift has transported over 1,300 metric tons of supplementary food and medical supplies from Nairobi to Mogadishu, Kismayu, Boroma and Baidoa. The airlift is continuing with two flights a day. As of July, UNICEF has been operating 8 mother and child health (MCH) centres at Mogadishu and provides support, including drugs and equipment, to 17 other MCH centres at Mogadishu, 2 at Kismayu, 1 in Baidoa and 7 in the north of Somalia. Medical equipment and fuel have also been supplied by UNICEF to hospitals and medical posts in Kismayu, Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Boroma. Mobile clinics have been used to assist 19 village health posts in the central and southern regions, in addition to 22 displaced persons camps at Kismayu and 68 in Mogadishu. Vaccination programmes have also been undertaken.

10. The World Health Organization (WHO), while not present in Somalia, has continued to support NGOs and self-help groups through the provision of basic health and drugs kits, equipment and medicines. WHO reports that during the past five months it has sent to Somalia each month an average US\$ 250,000 worth of medical and other supplies.

11. These efforts, however, are in no way adequate to meet the overall needs of the Somali people. Present estimates, which may be conservative, indicate

that as many as 4.5 million Somalis are in desperate need of food and other assistance. Death and starvation are widespread, especially in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The absence of food is a significant cause of the large-scale population movements that are taking place from Somalia into Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

12. The United Nations and its partners are ready and have the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance but they have been prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security that prevail throughout Somalia, often including Mogadishu itself. Heavily armed gangs overrun delivery and distribution points and loot supplies directly from docked ships as well as from airports and airstrips. I have previously reported to the Security Council the looting of high protein food and medicines at Mogadishu airport. More recently, on 16 August, while the technical team was in Somalia, armed gangs looted the first large-scale WFP shipment to Kismayu, as well as the entire consignment of diesel oil, which is essential for the transport of food to distribution centres. Current security conditions do not permit the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport and are thus the main cause of the current food crisis in Somalia.

13. The crisis is further compounded by drought in the South and the fact that the agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors have been devastated by the civil war. The food supply situation in Somalia will remain serious for the foreseeable future. In 1992, the cereal harvest will be poor because of insufficient rainfall, the absence of security and the collapse of infrastructure and markets. Food imports required by Somalia during the period from July 1992 to June 1993 are likely to be more than 500,000 metric tons. Food aid distributed free or sold on the market will have to meet most of this requirement.

14. Also because of the war, such health infrastructure as remains in Somalia can, at best, be described as rudimentary. Of the 15 hospitals that remain partially operational, most have neither water nor electricity nor drugs. The sanitary situation is deteriorating at an alarming pace and primary health care is practically non-existent. Disease is exacerbated by malnutrition and hunger.

15. Given the difficulties, I have come to the conclusion that the present airlift operations (already being carried out by WFP and UNICEF, as well as ICRC) need to be substantially enhanced. The technical team has recommended that for the immediate future airlift operations should be directed to the areas of need located primarily in central and southern Somalia, with priority attention being given to Baidoa, Hoddur, Bardera and Belet Wien.

16. Until Berbera port and the roads leading from it are secured, ad hoc airlifting of non-food items and supplementary food items may also be necessary from Djibouti to destinations in the north-west such as Hargeisa, Burao, Las Anod and Borama, where it is estimated that the displaced population and returnees from camps in Ethiopia number some 350,000 vulnerable persons. A worsening of the general food situation in these northern regions

is imminent because of the severe diminution of livestock, which has reached 75 per cent. Unless this can be halted, destitute agro-pastoralists will constitute a new wave of starving people flocking to the towns. There is thus a need for urgent provision of veterinary assistance.

17. The international community has expressed keen interest in contributing to an urgent airlift. The immediate offers of assistance received from the Governments of Canada, France, Germany and the United States of America are most welcome. This relief effort must, however, be carefully coordinated to ensure that there is no duplication of effort, that food and other relief items reach those most in need, and that suitable arrangements are made on the ground to ensure effective distribution and, where necessary, adequate security. Given the overall role, capacity and the experience of WFP in food aid and logistics, I have asked it to coordinate, within the United Nations, the current airlift initiative. Its Regional Logistics Office at Nairobi will be designated to serve as the focal point for these functions. The Regional Logistics Office will organize the airlift, in close liaison with all contributors, as well as relevant United Nations agencies and NGOs.

18. All contributors are asked to contact the Regional Logistics Office with offers of planes, food and non-food relief supplies, regardless of whether the assistance is to be placed at the disposal of United Nations operational organizations, NGOs or ICRC or delivered bilaterally. The Regional Logistics Office will provide the necessary advice and guidance on the capacities of airstrips, the arrangements for handover and distribution and related security considerations. As far as food is concerned, donors are requested to make available basic food commodities that are not of high value, in order to minimize looting and civil unrest.

19. The Regional Logistics Office will work closely with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator for Somalia, Mr. David Bassiouni, who, under the direction of my Special Representative, will continue to exercise overall responsibility for coordination, especially the identification of specific needs, priority areas for the airlift operation and all questions relating to the distribution of assistance. He will cooperate closely with the Commander of the military component of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in matters relating to the protection of relief operations in Somalia.

20. I would like to reiterate that the critical problem facing the United Nations in its humanitarian activities in Somalia is how to ensure the security of relief supplies at all stages, namely delivery, storage and distribution. It must also be underlined that critically important though the airlift may be, it cannot be a substitute for an effective surface-delivered programme of assistance through Somalia's ports and overland routes with WFP continuing to exercise leadership in logistics and food transportation. For this, effective security and ground arrangements are a sine qua non.

21. While concentrating at this stage on the issues of emergency relief and the provision of security for it, the United Nations will continue its efforts to implement the overall humanitarian programme for Somalia as reflected in

the updated consolidated inter-agency appeal, which I launched on 15 July 1992. The interrelated issues in the continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development have been identified in the report of the technical team and will be the subject of further reports.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF PREVENTIVE ZONES

22. Civil war, the insecurity and starvation are causing massive displacements and refugee flows. An emergency relief programme must try to halt these. A particularly serious situation exists along the Kenyan border, where some 280,000 Somali refugees are located, with 2,000 more arriving daily. The "preventive zone" concept reflected in the updated consolidated inter-agency appeal of 15 July 1992 needs to be put into effect immediately and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is ready to take the lead on this. The first phase of this programme will be the establishment of an operation to deliver food and seeds from Kenya to a preventive zone on the Somali side of the border in the Gedo region. This programme is intended to reduce significantly cross-border movements of people in search of food. It will also contribute to a decrease in frictions that are growing in the border area.

III. SECURITY AND CEASE-FIRE MONITORING

23. As noted in paragraph 20 above, the problem in Somalia today is not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to ports and airports in the country (though on occasions this can be hazardous) but the protection of the convoys that transport supplies from port or airport to warehouses and distribution centres, together with the protection of those stores and centres themselves. The technical team confirmed my earlier recommendation that this protection should be provided by United Nations security personnel operating on the lines described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829).

24. As far as Mogadishu is concerned, that recommendation was agreed in principle by the Security Council in paragraph 4 of its resolution 751 (1992). Following consultations with the two parties in Mogadishu, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the agreements signed on 27 and 28 March 1992 (S/23829, annex I), my Special Representative obtained the agreement of both of them on 12 August 1992 to the earliest possible deployment in Mogadishu of a 500-strong security force (S/24451). The Government of Pakistan has agreed to contribute a unit for this purpose and the Government of the United States has agreed to airlift it to Mogadishu. It is hoped that this deployment can take place very early in September. I am convinced that it is required in order to improve the effectiveness of current humanitarian efforts in Mogadishu and its immediate neighbourhood.

25. The technical team obtained the agreement of those concerned for the deployment of similar security units in two other parts of Somalia. The first would be at Bossasso in the north-east and, like its counterpart at Mogadishu,

would provide security at the port, escort convoys of relief supplies to distribution centres and protect the centres during distribution. The second would be deployed inland in the south-west and, subject to the consent of the Government of Kenya, would be based at Mandera, which lies just on the Kenyan side of the border some 470 kilometres north-west of Mogadishu. This unit's task would be to escort convoys of relief supplies from Kenya to the preventive zone which is being established along the Somali side of the border, in the Gedo region, as described in paragraph 22 above.

26. There are two other places where I believe that it is necessary for United Nations security units to be deployed for protective purposes. These are Berbera in the north-west and Kismayu in the south-east. The agreement of those concerned has not yet been obtained but I have instructed my Special Representative to give the highest priority to bringing his consultations on this matter to a successful conclusion.

27. The technical team also evaluated the possible extension of the current cease-fire activities of UNOSOM at Mogadishu to other parts of the country. Following the consultations reported in paragraph 19 of my report of 22 July 1992 (S/24343), the 50 military observers authorized for Mogadishu completed their deployment on 23 July 1992. They have since been able to play a valuable role in helping the two sides to maintain the cease-fire. After a number of preliminary meetings between the Chief Military Observer and his military counterparts on both sides, UNOSOM was able to arrange the first meeting, on 2 August 1992, of a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Chief Military Observer. The military observers are conducting mobile patrols in areas of Mogadishu, including the seaport and airport. Discussions continue to obtain for them freedom of movement to conduct mobile patrols in all parts of the city. The security situation in Mogadishu nevertheless remains precarious. On 4 August, heavy fighting took place in the Medina/Wagajir area of the city. UNOSOM succeeded in getting the parties to agree to a cease-fire and has since exerted strenuous efforts to prevent a resumption of hostilities.

28. As regards cease-fire monitoring in other parts of the country, the technical team paid particular attention to the possible deployment of military observers along the southern part of the Kenya-Somalia border. However, concern was expressed by several regional leaders about the implications of such an operation for the balance of military forces within the country. Given this attitude, the lack of an effective cease-fire and the fluidity of the fighting, I do not believe that it is at present feasible to deploy military observers for cease-fire monitoring purposes outside Mogadishu. The security of unarmed military observers would, in any case, be severely at risk in current circumstances.

29. I have accordingly instructed my Special Representative to inform me as soon as, in his judgement, conditions exist for the effective deployment of military observers, in reasonable security, to monitor cease-fires which can be negotiated in various regions, in addition to Mogadishu.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF FOUR ZONE HEADQUARTERS

30. It will be recalled that in my report of 22 July 1992 (S/24343, paras. 56 ff) I recommended that UNOSOM establish four operational zones, which would enable the Organization to establish a presence in all parts of Somalia and adopt an innovative and comprehensive approach dealing with the humanitarian relief and recovery programmes, the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation, in a consolidated framework.

31. The technical team has confirmed the validity of this concept. I therefore propose to establish the four zone headquarters as quickly as possible. Each headquarters will be headed by a civilian official who will assist my Special Representative in all aspects of his duties. It is envisaged that at this stage the nucleus of each headquarters, consisting of the Zone Director and the necessary administrative staff, will be put in place, with additional elements being added as the volume of United Nations activities increases in connection with the humanitarian programmes, the cease-fire, security and national reconciliation.

V. OBSERVATIONS

32. Somalia poses a particularly difficult challenge to the United Nations, which must find a means of responding to the urgent and overwhelming needs of a population growing increasingly desperate in the face of widespread hunger, the absence of national administration, almost complete destruction of basic infrastructure, and acute insecurity. This report has described urgent steps, which are planned or already being taken, to mitigate the current widespread starvation in the areas most seriously affected by internal strife and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is fraught with difficulties because of the vicious cycle of insecurity and hunger. Lack of security prevents the delivery of food, while food shortages contribute significantly to the level of violence and insecurity.

33. The immediate need is to break this vicious cycle. There must then be a comprehensive programme of action covering humanitarian relief, the cessation of hostilities, the reduction of organized and unorganized violence, and national reconciliation. Action to achieve the necessary improvement of the security situation must be comprehensive and multifaceted. There will need to be measures to demobilize regular and irregular forces and to re-establish law and order, initially on a local basis. A wide range of supporting interventions will be required to help re-establish local police forces: training, uniforms, communications and other equipment, as well as advisory services. However, such United Nations assistance will have to be contingent upon conditions that will ensure the neutrality of such forces: agreement by all relevant local authorities on the need for a unified local police force and on a neutral command structure, recruitment based on objective criteria and external monitoring.

34. I continue to believe that "food for arms" could be an important component of an effort to improve security conditions through a disarmament and demobilization programme. The technical team has, however, advised that at this stage the general effectiveness of such a programme in isolation is doubtful. Under present circumstances, Somalis see arms as a means not only of personal security but also of survival.

35. The programme of action will also have to include educational and vocational training programmes that offer alternative employment opportunities. The basic thrust must be to provide people with real alternatives for survival other than possession of arms. Equal consideration must be given to the reintegration of militia forces into a normal society.

36. A fundamental consideration that should guide all United Nations activities in Somalia is that the Somalis themselves should progressively assume responsibility for establishing conditions and arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Thus, a stronger United Nations role in securing access, transport and distribution of relief supplies must be paralleled by an effort to involve Somali entities fully in all aspects of this process. It is important that Somalis should be able to see the advantage to them of working with the international community rather than obliging the international community to take initiatives of its own without them. The fact is that the international community cannot stand idly by and witness the unnecessary loss of human lives in Somalia.

37. Much of the action described and recommended in this report is covered by existing mandates. However, it will be necessary for the Security Council to authorize the increases in UNOSOM strength that I have recommended. I will circulate as soon as possible an addendum to the present report containing preliminary cost estimates for these. They relate to the establishment of the four zone headquarters of UNOSOM and to the deployment of four additional security units, each with a strength of up to 750 all ranks. The first two will serve in Bossasso and the south-west, where those concerned have already given their agreement. The others will be deployed in Berbera and Kismayu as soon as consultations with those concerned have reached a successful conclusion. The total strength of United Nations security personnel whom I currently envisage deploying to Somalia is thus up to 3,500 all ranks, including the unit of 500 which has already been authorized for Mogadishu and will be assuming its duties there very shortly.

Annex

United Nations technical team to Somalia: itinerary and
programme of meetings

Mogadishu: 6 August 1992

The team met with the following members of the Interim Administration:

1. Ali Mahdi, Interim President
2. Dr. Aweys, Minister in the Presidency
3. General Mohammed Abdi, Commander, Government Forces

and with the following officials of the United Somali Congress (USC):

1. General Mohamad Farah Aidid, Commander, USC forces
2. Abdel-Karim Ali Ahmad, Secretary General, USC
3. Professor Issa

Bardera: 7 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. General Mohamad Farah Aidid, Commander, USC forces
2. Colonel Omar Jess, Chairman, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
3. Mohamad Abdi Warsame, Chairman, Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
4. Mohamad Nur Aliyu, Chairman, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Baidoa: 7 August 1992

The team met with the Governor and other local officials.

Belet Weni: 8 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Hassan Abdalle Qalad, Regional Governor
2. Ahmed Hagi Habibulah, Assistant Regional Governor
3. Mohamad Dado, District Commissioner

4. Mohamad Ahmed Hubero, Regional Security Commander
5. Omar Arte-Abdi, Police Commissioner

Kismayu: 9 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Ahmed Hoshe, Commander, SPM
2. Kismayu officials of the USC, SSNM, and SDM
3. Mr. Ahmed Jimale Geech, Commander, Somali Liberation Army (SLA), Kismayu

Galkaio/Garowe: 10 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, Chairman of State Emergency Committee
2. Colonel Said Mohamed Salah, Local Commander of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) Forces
3. Local Elders

Bossasso: 11 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. General Mohamad Abshir Musa, Chairman, SSDF
2. Mr. Bogor Abdulahi Bogor Muse, Head of Regional Administration
3. General Abdulahi Yousef, Commander, SSDF forces
4. General Osman S. Samanutar

Hargeisa/Burao: 12 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Abdurahman Ahmad Ali "Toor", President, Somali National Movement (SNM)
2. Ahmad Mohamad, Foreign Minister, SNM
3. Ahmad Mohamad Silanyo, Former President, SNM
Currently leader of Habr Toljaalo, Burao

Berbera: 13 August 1992

The team met with the following officials:

1. Ibrahim Hussein, Commander of Berbera Forces and Leader of Movement
2. Musa Hirsi, Chief of Elders
3. Abdilahi Abdi Muse, Head of Rehabilitation
4. Osman Hassan, Elders and Administration Committee
